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A Rubinstein bargaining model refers to a class of bargaining games that feature alternating offers through an infinite time horizon. The original proof is due to Ariel Rubinstein in a 1982 paper. For a long time, the solution to this type of game was a mystery; thus, Rubinstein's solution is one of the most influential findings in game theory. ==Requirements== A standard Rubinstein bargaining model has the following elements: * Two players * Complete information * Unlimited offers—the game keeps going until one player accepts an offer * Alternating offers—the first player makes an offer in the first period, if the second player rejects, the game moves to the second period in which the second player makes an offer, if the first rejects, the game moves to the third period, and so forth * Delays are costly 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Rubinstein bargaining model」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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